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Pappaconstantinou v. State: 
The Common-Law Requirement that a Confession Be Voluntary Does Not Apply 
When a Private Individual Elicits a Confession 
T he Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the 
common-law requirement of 
voluntariness does not apply to 
confessions elicited by private 
individuals. Pappaconstantinou v. 
State, 352 Md. 167, 721 A.2d 241 
(1998). In so holding, the court found 
that questions of admissibility 
regarding confessions elicited by 
private individuals should be decided 
by the rules of evidence, more 
specifically, by the rules of relevance. 
This case is important to Maryland 
law because it sets forth a bright-line 
test allowing statements made to 
private individuals to be admissible if 
they are relevant. 
Pappaconstantinou ("Pappas") 
was employed at Auto Row Auto 
Parts ("Auto Row") in Waldorf, 
Maryland. Id. at 170, 721 A.2d at 
242. He was fired following suspicion 
that he was stealing from the company. 
Id.at170, 721 A.2dat242-43. After 
his termination, Pappas met with Auto 
Row employees, at which time he 
signed a statement admitting that he 
had stolen from the company and had 
been justly terminated. Id. at 170, 721 
A.2d at 243. 
Criminal charges were 
subsequently brought against Pappas 
for theft in the Circuit Court of 
Maryland for Charles County. /d. 
Pappas filed a pre-trial motion to 
suppress his statement, which the trial 
court did not address at the pre-trial 
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stage. Id. At trial, Pappas renewed 
his motion to suppress. Id. The trial 
court determined that Pappas's 
confession was admissible because it 
was voluntary and competent 
evidence. Id. at 170-71, 721 A.2d 
at243. AjuryfoundPappasguiltyof 
twelve counts of theft under $300 and 
one count over $300. Id. at 170, 721 
A.2d at 243. Pappas appealed to the 
Court of Special Appeals of 
Maryland, which affirmed. Id. at 171, 
721 A.2d at 243. The Court of 
Appeals of Maryland granted 
certiorari and affirmed the court of 
special appeals. Id. 
The issue before the court was 
whether Pappas' confession to his 
employer should have been excluded 
from evidence at trial for lack of 
voluntariness. Id. at 170, 721 A.2d 
at 242. Pappas contended that he 
confessed because his former 
employer promised not to prosecute 
ifhe admitted to the thefts. Id. at 171, 
721 A.2d at 243. He acknowledged 
that no governmental actors were 
involved in eliciting his confession. Id. 
Arguing that no distinction exists 
between statements made to 
government agents and statements 
made to private individuals, Pappas 
urged the court to extend Maryland's 
common-law voluntariness doctrine to 
statements made to private individuals. 
Id. In the alternative, Pappas argued 
that the voluntariness doctrine's 
requirement that the statement be 
made to a "person in authority" 
should include statements made to 
employers. Id. at 172, 721 A.2d at 
243. The State, on the other hand, 
argued that admissibility depended 
solely upon the reliability of the 
statement. Id. at 172, 721 A.2d at 
244. 
To be admissible, the court 
stated, a confession must be "(1) 
voluntary under Maryland non-
constitutional law, (2) voluntary under 
the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution and Article 22 of 
the Maryland Declaration of Rights , 
and (3) elicited in conformance with 
the mandates of Miranda." Id. 
(quoting Ball v. State, 347 Md. 156, 
173-74, 699 A.2d 1170, 1178 
(1997». The court determined that 
the constitutional requirements of 
federal due process and Miranda 
warnings do not apply to private 
actions. Id. at 173,721 A.2d at 244. 
Thus, the issue in 
Pappaconstantinou turned on 
whether Pappas's confession was 
admissible under Maryland law. Id. 
at 172-73, 721 A.2d at 244. 
In reaching its conclusion, the 
court reviewed Maryland case law, 
which, in summary, required 
incriminating statements to be 
excluded from evidence when made 
directly to an "officer or sheriff, or in 
the presence and with at least the 
implicit sanction oflegal authority." 
Id. at 178, 721 A.2d at 246. The 
seminal case in Maryland, Nicholson 
v. State, held that a confession is 
inadmissible ifit is induced by a police 
officer's threat or promise of 
advantage. Id. at 174, 721 A.2d at 
245 (citing Nicholson v. State, 38 
Md. 140, 153 (1873». 
The court noted only two cases 
upon which Pappas could rely to 
support his position. Id. at 178, 721 
A. 2d at 247. The first, Watts v. State, 
held that a confession made to a 
reporter in the presence of the deputy 
sheriff and warden was inadmissible 
for lack of voluntariness. Id at 178-
79,721 A. 2d at 247 (citing Wattsv. 
State 99 Md. 30,35,57 A. 542, 544 
(1904». In the second case, Scott 
v. State, the defendant alleged that he 
was threatened by his father in the 
presence of the police. Id. at 179, 
721 A.2dat247 (citingScottv. State, 
61 Md. App. 599, 602, 487 A.2d 
1204, 1205 (1985». The court in 
Scott stated in dicta that the lack of 
an agency relationship does not 
"preclude a finding that the confession 
was involuntary." Id. (quoting Scott 
at 604,487 A.2d at 1206». 
The court, however, 
distinguished Watts and Scott because 
both involved confessions obtained in 
the presence of the police and 
"[n]either case stands for the 
proposition that a confession elicited 
by purely private conduct is subject 
to Maryland's common-law 
voluntariness requirement." Id. at 
180, 721 A.2d at 247. Thus, in order 
for a confession to be rendered 
involuntary, the confession must be 
given in the presence of at least one 
person having legal authority over the 
accused. Id. As such, the court 
concluded that Maryland's common-
law requirement of voluntariness does 
not apply when a private individual, 
acting without police intervention, 
elicits a confession, as was the case 
here. Id. at 180, 721 A.2d at 248. 
Next, the court rejected 
Pappas's alternative argument that 
"persons in authority" should not be 
limited to state actors and should 
include persons, such as employers, 
who "have real authority over the 
accused and the power to carry out a 
threat or promise." Id. The court 
stated that the requirement of 
voluntariness protects citizens from 
"overreaching" police. Id. at 180-
81, 721 A.2d at 248. Consequently, 
excluding confessions obtained by 
private persons does nothing to further 
the goal of deterring overreaching 
police conduct. Id. 
Rejecting both of Pappas's 
voluntariness arguments, the court 
stated that whether a statement made 
to a private actor is admissible 
depends on whether it is trustworthy, 
competent, and accurate. Id. at 181, 
721 A.2d at 248 (citing Jacobs v. 
State, 45 Md. App. 634, 646,415 
A.2d 590, 597 (1980». The court 
held that the issue of trustworthiness 
was to be reviewed under the 
Maryland Rules of Evidence, which 
pennits the admissibility of all relevant 
evidence. !d. (citing MD. R. EVID. 
5-402). Relevant evidence, the court 
stated, is evidence which makes the 
existence of a fact "more probable or 
less probable than it would be without 
the evidence." Id. (citing MD. R. 
EVID. 5-401). The court noted, 
however, that Maryland law allows for 
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the exclusion of relevant evidence 
where there is a danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion, or delay. Id. 
(citing Mo. R. EVID. 5-601). 
The trial court, the court stated, 
determines whether evidence is 
relevant and admissible. Id. at 182, 
721 A.2d at 248 (citing McCleary v. 
State, 122 Md. 394, 408, 89 A. 
1100,1106 (1914». Oncethetrial 
judge determines admissibility, the jury 
may hear the evidence and give it 
"whatever weight it chooses" and 
decide whether threats or promises 
were present which would have 
rendered the defendant's confession 
involuntary. Id. at 182,721 A.2dat 
249. Finding that the trial court did 
not err in determining that Pappas's 
written statement was "sufficiently 
reliable" to be admitted into evidence 
at trial, the court of appeals affirmed 
the trial court. Id. at 183, 721 A.2d 
at 249. 
Following the decision in this 
case, the voluntariness requirement is 
not extended to apply to statements 
made to private actors. This holding 
may result in private actors taking the 
law into their own hands by coercing 
confessions and handing them over to 
the police. In other words, private 
actors may, in effect, perform a law 
enforcement function having a 
coercive, overreaching effect - the 
kind of effect the voluntariness 
requirement attempts to alleviate. 
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